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What is there in the history, power, or mode of procedure of
constitutional conventions which should deservedly make them
contend against unpopularity? Have they in times past met in
response to arbitrary calls, invested with powers of annihilation
to the state; have they acted unofficially, disregarding law and
custom, supplanting existing organization through revolutionary
methods; or have they when charged with definite powers disre-
garded the purposes of assembling, seemingly acting as if they
were above the law and its limitations and violating state interests
to promote selfish ends? If such facts mark their genesis and
development no plea can be interposed in their behalf. But their
history, from the earliest original to the latest amendatory con-
vention, warrants no such conclusion.
Let us consider the cause of and foundation for the wide-
spread prejudice that plainly exists, taking as a case the experi-
ence of a neighboring state within the past several months where
a convention in all its phases received a full discussion. A defect
or inadequacy had manifested itself in the constitution; forces
were at work undermining well-regulated liberty. Some of the
citizens, recognizing that weak fundamental law commanded
neither fear nor respect and that unless the constitution would be
amended state and individual interests would feel the pressure of
such defects, appealed for a clearer constitutional statement of
their rights. To the people the legislature entrusted the minis-
terial duty of voting for or against the convention. The vote
showed an overwhelming opposition to the movement. A study
of- the press articles during the campaign seems to admit of an
analysis of the more vigorous protests in the following divisions:
x. From those in favor of entrusting the work to.the legislature and not
to a special commission.
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2. From those who oppose any change at any time and in any manner of
the organic law of the state.
3. Those who fear that a convention once assembled can disregard all
limitations imposed upon it and take to itself an absolute sovereignty, freed
from the responsibility even of submitting its work to the people for ratifica-
tion or disapproval.
As to the first objection. A legislature is not adapted to work
of this character and the impropriety of working on a line for
which there is no qualification is inferrible from the fact that no
one of ordinary prudence would follow sich a principle. "An
assembly that solves problems of municipal law is not tensioned for
working out principles of fundamental law." The latter requires
a higher grade of talents, a wider experience in the affairs of the
state, a truer sense of the expediency of recognizing social move-
ments, a keener discernment of the reciprocity of right and obli-
gation, and a profounder study of state necessities than the
former. The legislature through the complexity of the work
brought before it is forced to hasty legislation at once incompati-
ble with the exactness required in framing organic law. As the
close of the session draws near the press and rush renders incapa-
ble of effective work even those whose integrity of purpose may
be unquestioned. Party interests must be subserved and the party
influence presses most forcibly until the purposes desired are
secured. The slowness of the earlier part of the session is a
resultant in part of the variant nature of the business and in part
of the policy required to attain ends. The admixture of interests
represented in its members will not admit of that freedom of
action required where all else but the one work in hand is rele-
gated to the rear, as is necessary for effective work in a constitu-
tional convention. This multiplicity of interests and complexity
of business will not admit of that concerted, inter-dependent
action which the supreme importance of the work of a convention
demands. At work to-day on a trivial private bill and to-morrow
on a vital question of fundamental law- the transition is too
great for the mind of the average legislator. The method of a
legislature, moreover, is ill adapted to the work of amendment.
The cumbrous system of a myriad of committees fails to set free
an interchange of opinion on the floor of the assembly, in which
place alone the technical refinement and legal astuteness of the
lawyer and jurist meet the views of the man of hard, practical
wisdom. No legislative body having an elaborate system of com-
mittees can furnish the directness of action required of a constitu-
tional convention. A legislature has, moreover, an inherent
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weakness in the two-house plan. Shuffling a measure back and
forth from house to house, shirking responsibility by this evasion,
running away by insensible degrees from the point in issue, and
finally killing the measure without giving the people an opportu-
nity to fix the responsibility- violative of the trust imposed in
them-that is no fit place for vital action where the habit of
obedience to the constituency has not been acquired. A conven-
tion, on the contrary, avoids all these legislative drawbacks. The
delegates are selected for one determinate purpose ensuring a
concentration of energies ; that pot-pourri of motives which sends
many unworthy representatives to legislatures, and which the
purely unselfish members are powerless to countervail, is found
lacking where only men capable of high trusts are sent. Com-
missioned to search out defects they are watchful for any opening
which admits of a violation and are energetic to secure the rem-
edy. Their oneness of purpose means a unity of action, ensuring
expedition; and their clear intelligence makes the act of changing
an act of purifying.
As to the second class-those who in their antiquated conser-
vatism so worship the letter of the constitution as to regard any
change an impairment of its virtues. To such, new-modelling a
constitution is a work prompted by an unreliable public feeling.
Undoubtedly, there is in a republic an inborn regard and rever-
ence for the written organic law of the land- a bulwark to repub-
lican institutions which minimizes the chance of radical and revo-
lutionary ideas from taking root-but in every government a
wrong tolerated crowds out a right and an error known to exist in
the fundamental law requires correction. No matter how strong
may be the restrictive policy of the people regarding " Constitu-
tion patching" it is their duty to re-cast their fundamental law
when defects are apparent therein.
Many of our state constitutions were framed when haste was
necessary and when permanency was not in the framers' minds.
But under the pressure of this feeling they have been endured
until now when their inadequacy is manifest. Constitutional prin-
ciples are better understood now than at the time of framing, and
the absence of essential provisions through accident or inadver-
tence possibly, but more probably through a lack of knowledge in
the framers, prevents the constitution from harmonizing with the,
social and economic conditions of the day, and fails to apprise the
people of their rights and obligations. The movements of organ-
ized labor, the question of taxation, these and others have made
changes, but they have not been added to the fundamental laws
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-a defect which strains the state frame-work and weakens it.
Such a political condition invites disorder, and progress in a State
is co-extensive and co-existent with peace- civil polity, therefore,
requires that they be kept in close companionship.
How then are these difficulties to be met? By yielding to the
temptation to violate a constitutional provision which conflicts
with state interests or under the pressure of state necessity to
disregard it ? Will civic dignity allow a reasonable interpretation
of a provision to be narrowed in order to save the constitution
from amendment which the views of some hold to be a vice ? Or
shall we through the propulsive energy of public opinion and
public necessity brought to bear on the judiciary force it to prac-
tically give the desired amendatory enactments? Or shall we
recognize the transcendental claims for the dignity of the consti-
tution which this class urges and remain remediless ? Such plans
are unworthy of reasoning men. A defect always works evil, and
strong public policy demands a correction. Our regard for the
constitution was a part of our heritage, but this will not justify us
in tolerating that which will not reconcile progress with safety.
A constitution in its nature can deal only in generalities, yet there
is no reason why these should be clouded mysteries to the citizens
-consonance with the principles of government no more requires
obscurity than it does any other vice. A constitution should not
be inflexible, withal, for defined powers made determinate while
the state is in a period of transition soon show their weakness -
an inseparable consequent of an attempt to make sharp the line
of cleavage between the permissible and the forbidden during a
period of growth or decay.
If such unsatisfactoriness results, can I, a unit of the state,
"sitting in my arbor by the wayside, smoking my hookah of con-
tentment and eating the sweet lotus leaves of indolence," justify
myself in my unconcern because the constitution is avowedly
good in aim and purpose, because its framers had the best inten-
tions ? Would private right or state necessity justify me in a
course so incompatible with the healthy life of the state? Is not
my coquetting with my privilege and obligation as a citizen anti-
republican? Does not my unreasonable nicety on the question of
constitutional amendments make me powerless to bear my pro-
portionate share of duties as a member of the state society ? Is
there a forum of mind or morality which recognizing the peculiar
institutions of a republic would require of me as a follower such
self sacrifice for the good of the state ? It is my duty to demand
my rights. "No truth is becoming more clear in our day than
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS.
that in demanding everywhere the supreme direction of the Com-
monwealth and in asserting a right to determine the modes and
instruments of its administration, the people-the nation-are
but re-claiming their own."
The third class of objectors bring forward the legal aspect of
the question in asking: Can a convention once assembled impute
to itself sovereignty? The question has suggested itself to honest
minds. Can we be reasonably certain that the powers we, as
electors delegate to the convention, will be honestly executed ?
If we commission them with a determinate function can they
gather to themselves greater attributions of power ? Can they
supplant our wishes, treading under foot public policy and private
right? Must we accept the fruit of violated instructions ? Can
they change our express mandate and make it of no obligatory
force ? Let us consider.
A convention can have entrusted to it express and implied
powers. The general rule as to implied powers (Jameson on Con-
stitutional Conventions, page 455) is that they are such as "are
requisite to secure their own comfort, to protect and preserve
their dignity and efficiency, and to ensure orderly procedure in
their business." This line of powers, it is evident, would not
admit of a convention taking to itself any force capable of injur-
ing any state, governmental or individual interests, and should it
be attempted the streng:tn of the judiciary would speedily make
nugatory any such ill-timed scheme. Express powers, then, only
demand our consideration. If the convention obeys instructions
as mapped out by the people it completes its work and suffers dis-
solution by that act. But it disregards the limitations imposed
upon it. Were, therefore, (i) these restrictions mandatory or
discretionary, and (2) can the people be the final arbiters making
the conventipn's work merely recommendatory or is it binding
upon them without submission for their inspection. The first of
these two questions received a thorough consideration in the case
of Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. State Reports, page 71, wherein Judge
Agnew held:
"A Convention has no inherent rights: it exercises lowers only. .Dele-
gated power defines itself. To be delegated it must come in some adopted
manner to convey it by some defined means. This adopted manner, therefore,
becomes the measure of the power confined. The right of the people is abso-
lute in the language of the Bill of Rights to.' alter, reform or abolish their gov-
ernment in such manner as they may think proper.' This right being theirs
they may impart so much or so little of it as they shall deem expedient.
* * * To impute absolute power to a convention of mere delegates
* * * is to assume a grant by the people without terms, without the
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means of limitation, and without any clearly evinced intent. It is an assump-
tion without a just basis against the security, the interest and the welfare of
the people which no body of men have a right to make and no judicial reason
or rule can justify."
And again:
"The people have the same right to limit the power of their delegates that
they have to bind the power of their representatives. Each are representatives
but only in a different sphere. * * * The right of the people to restrain
their delegates by law cannot be denied unless the power to call a convention
by law and the right of self-protection be also denied."
The view of the jurist as above given is acquiesced in by
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, page 493, as follows:
"The Act of Assembly under which a convention meets is its charter.
* * * What is a convention that it should assume to be exempt from
obedience to that department of the government which is charged with higher
sovereign attributes-is more nearly sovereign-than any other in it? Does
it claim itself to be above the legislature ? Let it show its warrant for a claim
so exorbitant, for upon it must rest the burden of proving what contradicts all
political analogies and the first principles of constitutional government. It
cannot find that warrant in the mandate of the power by whose fiat it came
into being for by hypothesis that is expressly to the contrary. * * *
Nor can a warrant for the claim be found in the principles which preside over
the genesis and healthy growth of the communities for those principles require
conventions to rank themselves as the servants not the masters of the people ;
and when the will of the people is known to conform themselves scrupulously
to it."
The same view has been taken by a member of a constitu-
tional convention. In the Pennsylvania Convention of 1872-73,
Jeremiah Black, a delegate, speaking of the binding power of
legislative limitations, said:
"1 No one will deny that we are sitting here in pursuance of certain acts of
the legislature-the two acts of the legislature-one which authorized a vote
by the people upon the question, and the other one which authorized the elec-
tion of delegates to the Convention. If we derive our power from that source,
is it possible that we can have it without the limitations that were imposed upon
it by those who created it? I don't think that question can be answered in but
one way." (See Debates Pa. Convention, 1872, voli, pp. 57, 58).
The second question presents itself. Suppose the convention
has apparently limited itself by the restrictions imposed but yet
refuses to submit its work to the people for ratification or disap-
proval can its work go into effect without such ratification ? As
constituted judges of the work can the people not feel safe in the
belief that the work of the convention must be submitted to them?
This thought also receives careful consideration in the case cited
above (Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. State Reports, p 74) Judge Agnew
holding that:
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"A limit must be set to power. No people can be safe in the presence of
a divine right to rule or of self-imputed sovereignty in their servants to bind
them without ratification. * * * Let a convention in such seasons pos-
sess by mere imputation all the powers of the people, and what security is
there for their fundamental rights? * * * Once assembled a conven-
tion according to this dogma is all powerful * * and may proclaim a consti-
tution without let or hindrance. The fundamental rights of the people, the
true principle of civil liberty, the nature of delegated powers and the liability
of the people to a temporary convention all rise up in earnest protest against
such a doctrine of imputed sovereignty in mere servants of the people."
No agent or subordinate can claim the powers, or franchises of
the people except by express grant or by a plain implication.
Such objections, however, are unworthy of consideration from
the fact of their rare occurrence. There have been assembled in
the United States nearly two hundred constitutional conventions
of different kinds and probably in only three, the Georgia conven-
tion of 1789, the Illinois convention of 1862, and the Pennsylvania
convention of 1872-73, have any instructions been violated and
then only in matters of minor importance. These violations,
probably, were prompted by a feeling of the need of the times for
the change recommended by the Pennsylvania convention, which
was an over-stepping of its powers, was subsequently ratified by
the people. (See Debates of Pennsylvania Convention of 1872,
vol. 8, pages 620-712).
But the question naturally arises whether there is no weakness
in the structure of a modern convention. Familiar as every one
interested in the science of government must be, with the theory
as well as the workings of all legislative bodies of which a consti-
tutional convention is a type, the question is one not of abstract
principles to be solved by a publicist or jurist but one of fact
capable of solution by the people. The answer is focussed here
-the matter of paramount importance is the selection of suitable
delegates, men of sound sense and patriotism, of hard, practical
wisdom, upon whom the loose jargon of political organs and the
scare arguments of subsidized newspapers fall without making an
impression. Those only can be trusted who recognize that social
duties and obligations are superior to individual rights and inter-
ests and who can be relied on to do naught save what is legally
and morally defensible. The likelihood of danger from this
source is easy to overcome -let the people act as if they thought
the convention required the best efforts of the best men, and the
best men will offer themselves for the work; if the people are
indifferent and unconcerned they can expect, as in any case will
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happen that the boss-favoring and the corporation-favoring aspi-
rant, throwing away all sense of honor and patriotism to his state
and of obligation to his constituency will do his worst for his
odious master. But granting the latter possibility for argument's
sake would anything be accomplished ? Granted that the dele-
gates would turn aside from all considerations of the social needs
could they through the bastard power even momentarily accom-
plish their corrupt object? The people having hedged about the
delegated powers with restrictive checks which the courts have
adjudged to be mandatory and likewise that their action must be
submitted to the people for ratification or rejection it is at once
apparent that such a move on the part of the delegates would be
futile and ill-fated. Fears of trouble from these sources are
groundless. Who would look for an organized party resistance to
the expressed wish of the people - such a stand would only ante-
date the party's ruin. Where the masses make a request who
would look for the request suffering a lonely advocacy-questions
of living importance which have received the people's attention it
is our experience never stand unsupported. The high excellence
of a constitutional reform would attract, it can reasonably be sup-
posed, the best men of all parties to its support. Matthew
Arnold's "saving remnant," would spring into a material being
here to vanquish self-interests and offensive partisanship, sharply
drawn as party dissensions may be. Statesmanship will be
accorded here one of its few opportunities for assertive, aggressive
work and its productivity of goodwill be more apparent and to
a wider range of subjects than many of its triumphs on other
fields of struggle.
Possibly no cause for fear can be well grounded concerning the
work of political intimidators on the delegates elected by the peo-
ple. A constitutional conventfon, mayhaps, does not work directly
enough against corporations to draw out from them an opposition;
no party will give orders to fly in the face of destiny and decimate
its own number; and no delegate will be honored with an elec-
tion whose integrity of purpose the people are not assured of
before the election. This is the recorded experience of past con-
ventions. Policy -individual, party or public,-is forceful and
restraining when the expediency of a movement -individual,
party, or public -is in question.
But does not the history of constitutional conventions dispel
any fear that any but the best men will be selected to sit as dele-
gates. In the Massachusetts convention of 1820 sat Mr. Justice
Story and Daniel Webster. Would not the judicial learning of
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the former have swayed his co-laborers into a line of right think-
ing and right doing had occasion served to exercise his powers, or
had the convention attempted to over-step its defined rights would
the eloquence of Webster have been nursed in silence ? Did
Chancellor Kent and the Livingstons in the New York convention
of 1821I fail to consider the peculiar dangers of the age or the
almost sacred character of their work ? Could any movement not
in consonance with the principles of peaceful and constitutional
government have escaped the sleepless vigilance of John Randolph
in the Virginia convention of 1829 ? In transacting business of so
transcendent importance would Willard Hall in the Delaware con-
vention of r852 not have prevented anything puerile and unworthy
so far as it lay in his power? Did Choate in the Massachusetts
convention of 1853 lack the prudent foresight and conservatism
one would expect to find in a great lawyer? Or did not Jeremiah
Black in the Pennsylvania convention of 1872-73 strive with a
vigor and a-steadfast zeal worthy of his noble character to make
the work of their assembly a work of conscience as well as of
political right?
We read our answer in their names and lives. Every step
taken was the culled good of past experience and was made capa-
ble in so far as in their power lay of meeting the exigency of their
condition. They felt it a favor to be elected to represent a free
people and they acted on that feeling. They felt they were
bound in morals and in law to a care proportionate to the gravity
of the undertaking and they worked on that principle. Men to-
day are constructed on a like principle and will pledge themselves
to a like scrupulous exactness. To men fashioned in this mould a
power need not be construed in its hard literalism - their political
conscience and their known punctilious conformity to whatever is
honorable being a satisfying guarantee for their actions. It only
requires to attain to this state that the people show their con-
sciousness of their political needs by demanding the necessary
amendments. Such an appeal betokens well- at once indicative
of a sound political training; of a guarded watch over their rights
and an acknowledgment of reciprocal obligations -a true test of
citizenship.
